Skip Navigation



Hum. Reprod. Advance Access published online on June 14, 2006
Human Reproduction, doi:10.1093/humrep/del209
This Article
Right arrow FREE Full Text (PDF ) Freely available
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
21/10/2491    most recent
del209v1
Right arrow Submit a response
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me when eLetters are posted
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in PubMed
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Benatar, D.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
PubMed
Right arrow PubMed Citation
Right arrow Articles by Benatar, D.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2006. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Opinion

Reproductive freedom and risk

David Benatar 1 *

1 Philosophy Department, University of Cape Town, South Africa

* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
David Benatar, E-mail: dbenatar{at}humanities.uct.ac.za


  Abstract

It is widely recognized that one person’s freedom may be limited to prevent harm to another (non-consenting) person. It is curious, therefore, that where a right to reproductive freedom is recognized, there is considerable reticence to limit or override it in cases where reproduction harms those people who are brought into existence. I argue that this is inappropriate. If there should be no right to inflict a harm in non-reproductive contexts then there should be no right to inflict an equivalent harm in reproductive contexts. Because of the long history of bias and arbitrary discrimination in curtailments of reproductive freedom, I suggest how bias might be avoided in deciding how severe a harm must be to defeat a right to reproductive freedom.

Keywords: harm/Reproductive freedom/risk.
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Hum ReprodHome page
A.L. Bredenoord, W. Dondorp, G. Pennings, C.E.M. De Die-Smulders, and G. De Wert
PGD to reduce reproductive risk: the case of mitochondrial DNA disorders
Hum. Reprod., November 1, 2008; 23(11): 2392 - 2401.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Hum Reprod UpdateHome page
A.L. Bredenoord, G. Pennings, H.J. Smeets, and G. de Wert
Dealing with uncertainties: ethics of prenatal diagnosis and preimplantation genetic diagnosis to prevent mitochondrial disorders
Hum. Reprod. Update, January 1, 2008; 14(1): 83 - 94.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.